tung."7 Thus the philological battle over BT was fought out entirely in the published backwaters of the intellectual world.
Only two years after the book was published did a review finally appear in a philological journal. This review has been neglected by Nietzsche scholars, and I shall return to it in Section III below. As for the immediate response of the profession, Nietzsche said repeatedly that he considered it to be silence8-he dismissed Wilamowitz.9 The idea that the profession met the book with "violent controversy" has always been based on the reactions of two philologists: Wilamowitz with his two pamphlets, and Herman Usener of Bonn. On close inspection, little can be made of the reactions of either man.
Wilamowitz has been referred to in this connection as "the guild."'0 But he was clearly an unrepresentative voice: he was a very junior member of the profession, having as yet no academic appointment; he found it impossible in any case, as just discussed, to publish his attack with a scholarly journal and so cannot be said to have broken the profession's publicly silent facade; and he had, according to his biographer, motives of personal animosity for attacking Nietzsche that the whole profession could not have shared.-As for Hermann Usener, Nietzsche reported in two letters that Usener had declared him to be '"wissenschaftlich tot" ("dead as a scholar"). These words have been described as "public censure." 2 But Nietzsche's account of the incident hardly tallies with the description "public censure":
In Leipzig, there reigns one opinion about my book: according to this the excellent Usener, whom I so much respect, upon questioning from his students, has let slip [verrathen] , "it is mere nonsense, of which nothing can be made: anybody who has written such a thing is dead as a scholar." It is as though I had committed a crime; there has been ten months of silence now, because everybody believes himself to be so far beyond my book, that there is not a word to be wasted on it. Thus Overbeck represents to me the situation in Leipzig.'3 His students prodded Usener into making a pronouncement he never intended to make. The story is, if anything, strong evidence of Usener's intention to maintain silence as a senior member of the profession. Nietzsche understood the response of the profession to his book to be 7 In Griinder (ed. Wilamowitz feared that in attacking Nietzsche he would be perceived to be attacking a "great mind." Clearly Nietzsche resembled, at least in the eyes of his contemporaries, the philological master whom Wilamowitz describes. It is accordingly among the "great minds" that we must seek for the models Nietzsche set himself. And Wilamowitz's "great minds" can readily be found in the firmament of German classical philology. There are innumerable passages in the philological literature of the 1830s, 1840s, and to a lesser extent 1850s that closely resemble the passage of Wilamowitz just quoted. To represent the literature of the "great minds" in this earlier period in the history of the discipline, I have chosen a sample of the so-called "encyclopedias," general introductions to the study of Antiquity given by full professors at German universities. These "encyclopedic" lectures display not only the mastery of the professors that gave them but a whole ethic of mastery that pervaded classical philology in their time. Here, for example, is S. F. W. Hoffman, writing in the Introduction to his encyclopedic work published in 1835:
It has been my goal, faithful to the task before me, to stimulate independent thinking [eigenes Denken] by presenting the accepted wisdom, to stimulate independent investigation among already advanced students, in the broad field of the study of Antiquity, not in such a way that the student can be satisfied with the knowledge of single Erscheinungen from the life of the ancients, as they appear before our eyes in their written work and artwork, but in such a way that the student strive lovingly to investigate the Geist from which all those works proceed, and which, as it were, continues to preside over them, visible only to the spiritual eye.21
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We see here precisely the vocabulary of concepts Wilamowitz resorted to four decades later: the understanding of the pupil-teacher relationship in terms of the play of freedom and submission, the postulate that the remains of Antiquity are to be viewed singly as Erscheinungen of one greater Geist, the conviction that mastering the study of Antiquity is the business of cultivating "the spiritual eye." Hoffman was a "great Geist."
But we must turn to other encyclopedic literature for clear statements of what is only implicit in Hoffmann: the degree to which the doctrine of the discipline could center on the personal powers of the "great Geist." Here is Gottfried Bernhardy, in the Introduction to his important encyclopedia,22 published in 1832:
There is no lack of handbooks and rulebooks, either for the discipline as a whole or for its sub-disciplines; but their usefulness up until now has been uncertain and ambiguous. How should general norms bear fruit in so marvelous a field of knowledge, when knowledge establishes new ties with every subjectivity, and ends only with a hypothesis of many-sided form and fullness? If there is a way out of these contradictions, we must expect it from a master, who, at the end of his career, could resolve himself, with an illustrious candor of the heart to set down his student years, joys and sufferings, gains and errors, truths and wishes, as it were in an ennobled ana ...23
Bernhardy's emphasis on "Subjektivitait" and on the biographical storehouse of wisdom that must inform scholarship were frequently echoed. Veneration of the master as scholar was not to be separated from the veneration of the master as man. The son of August Matthia introduced his father's posthumous encyclopedia of 1835 in words largely borrowed from Bernhardy:
Well may the experience of half a century, which the blessed departed has set down in these pages with clear and simple words and with a candid heart, be welcome to many a man who, like the deceased, labors on this great structure [of philology] with free self-activity and from the deepest impulse of the soul. Of course, much remains here of the stamp of subjectivity, just as it will in all succeeding works of this kind, and new viewpoints will oppose themselves to the old, new assumptions will oppose themselves to old assumptions: who would offer his personal opinion as objective truth in this pathless, horizonless field? Nevertheless, conclusions of every kind, if they rise from the depths of the mind or from the golden treasury of a long life, are an abiding gain for the science. , 1955) The appeal this sort of description of the philologist would have for the young Nietzsche will be clear. Scholars have been mistaken in asserting that Nietzsche's sense of artistic vocation would have been at odds with his profession as classicist, for artistry had its traditional place in German classical philology. Conversely, we must not assume that Nietzsche was being disingenuous when he claimed that his book was "in the highest sense scientific."35 That phrase, "in the highest sense scientific," was one Nietzsche used in defending himself to his teacher, Friedrich Ritschl. He had good reason to hope for Ritschl's sympathy. For Ritschl was one of the last and most unreserved practitioners of the "subjective" magisterial philology of the 1830s. We possess two encyclopedic essays by Ritschl, one dating from 1833, the other from 1857-58.36 I shall discuss the second of these, the one composed nearest in time to Nietzsche's own student years. This second essay is striking first of all because of its form: it is a collection of aphorisms, Nietzsche's own favored form. The essay falls squarely into the subjectivist strain embodied in Bernhardy and Matthia, the presentation of "ennobled ana," of the "golden treasury of a long life." Ritschl's editor described it as elevated autobiography of the Bernhardian type:
... "On the Method of Philological Study" offers, it is true, only fragments and aphorisms and to that degree is only a weak substitute for the-as I clearly remember-general didactic discussion he had planned for the last volume of his opuscula, in which Ritschl wanted to set down his rich life experiences.37
We know from Ritschl's biographer that this "general didactic discussion" was to be a transcription of Ritschl's encyclopedic lectures.38 We have the testimony of others that Ritschl's encyclopedia communicated as much as anything else the biography and personality of Ritschl. Here, for example, is Erwin Rohde, reviewing Otto Ribbeck's Ritschl:
One can hardly seriously ask, whether any other manner of presentation could be more fruitful than these lectures, in which the full personality of a richly 34 (Anonymous), "Philologie und Sprachwissenschaft," in Preussische Jahrbicher, 7 (1861), 143.
35 For the mistaken assumption that artistry and philology were perceived as incompatible, see, e.g., Hayman, Nietzsche, 140. Allan Megill speaks of the "antiscientific animus" of BT without regard to Nietzsche's own belief that his book was "wissenschaft- The faculty of historical understanding is nothing other than comprehension of particular facts under philosophical hypotheses. represented a variant of the old postulate that Greek culture was to be viewed as the sum of "Erscheinungen" produced by the Greek "Geist." Nietzsche introduced only one fundamental modification into this old conception: he gave specific content, in the form of music, to the Geist that in earlier works remained exceedingly vaguely defined. In this respect Nietzsche's was a new view, but this new view arose out of an old claim to privileged insight, the claim of a "great Geist." Nietzsche was, in short, fully able to consider himself a classical philologist without considering himself a pedant. Quite the contrary, he was able to consider himself a seer, an unfettered genius. Classical philology gave play to Nietzsche's least scholarly tendencies. But that is not to say that classical philologists accepted Nietzsche's pretensions. Wilamowitz recognized that Nietzsche claimed to belong to the great tradition, but he refused to acknowledge Nietzsche as a "great Geist." Other philologists refused even to take notice of the publication of his book. I shall now return to the reception of BT, and attempt to account for their silence.
III ... Materialism is and must be the enemy of all philological and historical investigation. I mentioned before collaboration among philologists. It is, from time to time, bemoaned that philologists so rarely join together in common labor. But I believe that, on this account, they deserve more praise than blame. In order to establish this, I must first explain what I mean by common labor. I do not refer to that more mechanical form of collaboration in which, as occasionally happens, older, renowned scholars associate themselves with younger, less-well-known men, principally for the collection and classification of materials, for, so to speak, the coarser work, while reserving to themselves the lion's share of spiritual creation [des geistigen Schaffens] and even more of literary fame. It has to do rather with the question, in how far it is advisable that two philologists of equal qualification and rank engage in united labor on one and the same object of scholarly study. Now it seems to me that very weighty considerations stand against such a collaboration.... [I]t seems quite impossible... when it comes to the highest and noblest task of formal philology: the unified, artistically rounded, restitution of works of literature; impossible, even if the two philologists in question were entirely equal in talent and mutual toleration. For ... the critic often considers such subtle details of knowledge and judgment, that it is difficult to make them even comprehensible to someone else-let alone that the task could be accom-47 Cf. J. Whitman, "From Philology to Anthropology ... ," in History ofAnthropology, ed. G. Stocking (1984), II, 214-29; cf. also L. Gossman, Orpheus Philologus (Philadelphia, 1983). For Nietzsche's place in the materialistic controversy, Allan Megill's observations on the "antiscientific animus" of BT (cf. above n. 35) are valuable but terminologically misleading. Nietzsche was, after all, convinced of the "scientific" character of his work. To characterize the young Nietzsche accurately, one should speak of his "antimaterialistic" or "antipositivistic" animus.
